Citrix sharefile compromise

citrix sharefile compromise

Citrix has released a security update to address a vulnerability affecting Citrix ShareFile storage zones controller. Secure FTP Site Alternative - Citrix ShareFile If your made on the dark web by a threat actor alleging compromise of the Citrix network. All currently supported versions of Citrix ShareFile storage zones controller before 20 are affected by this issue. ULTRAVNC SERVER PASSWORD REGISTRY Невозможности доставки осуществляется оговоренное время по происшествиям пробки, катастрофа. В случае в получить время по независящим от оператором происшествиям просим уведомить поломка, катастрофа и т чем 2 часа. Добавить продукта сравнению Приобрести.

In each of these folders there is a file called info. In the info. At the end, we see a 32 character long uppercase string, which hints at an integrity hash for the data. We see two other IDs, fiaccdeb7-a5e9-e5e28a7faa90 and fobfaecfe0c27ce1e6 , which correspond with the file ID for the upload and folder ID to which the file is uploaded respectively.

After trying to figure out for a while what kind of hashing algorithm was used for the integrity check of this file, it turned out that it is a simple md5 hash of the rest of the data in the info. Armed with this knowledge we can write a simple python script which calculates the correct hash over a modified info. Here we find our second vulnerability: the info. This gives an attacker that can write to the storage folders the possibility to alter the upload information.

Since our previous vulnerability enabled us to write files to arbitrary locations, we can upload our own info. It turns out that when uploading data, the file ID fiaccdeb7-a5e9-e5e28a7faa90 is used as temporary name for the file. The data that is uploaded is written to this file, and when the upload is finilized this file is added to the users ShareFile account. We are going to attempt another path traversal here. Using the script above, we modify the file ID to a different filename to attempt to extract a test file called secret.

The somewhat redacted info. When we subsequently post to the upload-threaded Apparently, the filesize of the secret. We can upload a new info. It should be noted that all the information in the info. The downloading of files is also controlled by the ShareFile cloud component, which instructs the StorageZone controller to serve the frequested files. A typical download link looks as follows:. Here we see the dt parameter which contains the download token.

The information for the download token is stored in an XML file in the tokens directory. An example file is shown below:. Two things are of interest here. The first is the path property of the File element, which specifies which file the token is valid for. This suggests that the XML is signed to ensure its authenticity, and to prevent malicious tokens from being downloaded.

At this point we started looking at the StorageZone controller software itself. Since it is a program written in. While we obtained the StorageZone controller binaries from the server the software was running on, Citrix also offers this component as a download on their website. In the decompiled code, the functions responsible for verifying the token can quickly be found. In the code we find that a static key is used to verify the integrity of the XML file which is the same for all StorageZone controllers :.

Furthermore, when we looked at the code which calculates the signature, it turned out that the signature is calculated by prepending the secret to the data and calculating a sha1 hash over this. This makes the signature potentially vulnerable to a hash length extension attack , though we did not verify this in the time available. In summary, it turns out that the token files offer another avenue to download arbitrary files from ShareFile. Additionally, the integrity of these files is insufficiently verified to protect against attackers.

Unlike the previously described method which altered the upload data, this method will also decrypt encrypted files if encrypted storage is enabled within ShareFile. At this point we are able to write arbitrary files to any directory we want and to download files if the path is known. The file path however consists of random IDs which cannot be guessed in a realistic timeframe. It is thus still necessary for an attacker to find a method to enumerate the files stored in ShareFile and their corresponding IDs.

For this last step, we go back to the unzip functionality. The code responsible for extracting the zip file is partially shown below. What we see here is that the code creates a temporary directory to which it extracts the files from the archive. The uploadId parameter is used here in the name of the temporary directory.

Since we do not see any validation taking place of this path, this operation is possibly vulnerable to yet another path traversal. The request initially passes through the ValidateRequest function below:. What happens here is that the h parameter is extracted from the request, which is then used to verify all parameters in the url before the h parameter.

Thus any parameters following the h in the URL are completely unverified! So what happens here? Since the uploadid parameter is specified multiple times, IIS concatenates the values which are separated with a comma. Only the first uploadid parameter is verified by the HMAC, since it operates on the query string instead of the individual parameter values, and only verifies the portion of the string before the h parameter.

Vulnerability 7: Incorrectly implemented URL verification parameter pollution. Looking at the upload logic again, the code calls the function UploadLogic. RecursiveIteratePath after the files are extracted to the temporary directory, which recursively adds all the files it can find to the ShareFile account of the attacker some code was cut for readability :. The creation of directories can be performed with the directory traversal that was initially identified in the unzip operation, since this will create any non-existing directories.

To perform the final step and exploit the third path traversal, we post the following URL:. Going back to our ShareFile account, we now have hundreds of XML files with valid download tokens available, which all link to files stored within ShareFile.

We can download these files by modifying the path in our own download token files for which we have the authorized download URL. The only side effect is that adding files to the attackers account this way also recursively deletes all files and folders in the temporary directory. By traversing the path to the persistentstorage directory it is thus also possible to delete all files stored in the ShareFile instance.

By abusing a chain of correlated vulnerabilities it was possible for an attacker with any account allowing file uploads to access all files stored by the ShareFile on-premise StorageZone controller. Based on our research that was performed for a client, Fox-IT reported the following vulnerabilities to Citrix on July 4th Citrix was quick with following up on the issues and rolling out mitigations by disabling the unzip functionality in the cloud component of ShareFile.

While Fox-IT identified several major organisations and enterprises that use ShareFile, it is unknown if they were using the hybrid setup in a vulnerable configuration. Therefor, the number of affected installations and if these issues were abused is unknown. We have notified administrators of all accounts that have been affected.

If you have not received an email or ShareFile notification of an incident, then we do not have any indication that your accounts have been affected. We require a password reset for all accounts. Upon logging into ShareFile, you will no longer be able to use your old password.

You received an email providing a link to reset your password. If you cannot find that email, you can request the email again by clicking on Forgot Password from the login page. We strongly recommend the use of unique and complex passwords. You can find more information on managing your access at the following links: password management , multi-factor authentication , and security settings. We have ordered our activities to protect user accounts. We have taken a number of steps to address this issue, including disabling unauthorized account access and requiring all users to reset their passwords.

We continue to closely monitor our network to detect and prevent any suspicious activity associated with the Citrix ShareFile service. We strongly recommend the use of unique and complex passwords, as well as multi-factor authentication. Please do not make your new password similar to your prior password.

We recommend you also change your password on any other website or application on which you use a password that is the same as or similar to your password for your Citrix ShareFile account. We identified this issue recently. Our investigation to date indicates that the unauthorized activity may have started in late October.

We also recommend you change your password on any other website or application on which you use a password that is the same as or similar to your password for your account. We have no evidence at this time that this issue affected credit card information provided to Citrix to pay for Citrix ShareFile accounts. We believe an unauthorized party logged into a small percentage of accounts using credentials that were obtained from third-party sources. We have sent notices to administrators of affected Citrix ShareFile accounts.

We recommend periodically reviewing account activity and usage. Based on our investigation to date, we believe an unauthorized party used credentials obtained from third-party sources to attempt to access and obtain information from Citrix ShareFile Citrix Content Collaboration accounts. We believe these attempts were successful for a small percentage of Citrix ShareFile accounts. Was this page helpful?

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Explore the best 5 ways to reduce risk of a data breach by clicking here now and reading Citrix ShareFile's guide to secure cloud collaboration. Learn the best secure document workflows specifically for accountants by clicking here now.

Learn the most productive ways to work with your clients. Enhance your workflows and work securely now. Discover the benefits of secure collaboration for your financial services organization by clicking here now. Catch up to your competitors with Citrix ShareFile. Try Free. United States Australia. MENU Login. Search the Resource Center. Financial Partnerships and Integrations.

Storage zones created using the recently released versions of storage zones controllers listed below are not affected:. Storage zones created using a vulnerable version of the storage zones controller are at risk even if the storage zones controller has been subsequently updated. Customers with Citrix-managed storage zones do not need to take any action.

Customers with customer-managed storage zones should ensure they are running on a supported version. In order to address the issue customers are strongly recommended to run the mitigation tool as soon as possible on the storage zone controllers managing each impacted storage zone by following the guidance in the following support article:. Citirix would also like to thank Daniel Jensen dozernz for working with us to protect Citrix customers. Citrix is notifying customers and channel partners with customer-managed storage zone controllers about this potential security issue.

If you require technical assistance with this issue, please contact Citrix Technical Support. Citrix welcomes input regarding the security of its products and considers any and all potential vulnerabilities seriously. Failed to load featured products content, Please try again. Customers who viewed this article also viewed. Log in to Verify Download Permissions.

Description of Problem Security issues have been identified in customer-managed Citrix ShareFile storage zone controllers. These issues have been given the following identifiers: CVE CVE CVE Customer-managed storage zones created using the following versions of the storage zones controller are affected: ShareFile storage zones Controller 5. What Citrix Is Doing Citrix is notifying customers and channel partners with customer-managed storage zone controllers about this potential security issue.

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